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This paper presents a preliminary modeling and analysis of interactions between proposed
UAM operations and present-day conventional traffic if UAM operations occurred along FAA-
approved helicopter routes and altitude ceilings. It assesses the extent to which the UAM
operations will trigger TCAS resolution advisories (RA) aboard the conventional aircraft in
the Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) terminal airspace. It is observed that under deterministic UAM
operational conditions, no RAs will be triggered. Furthermore, the impact of UAM altitude
uncertainty is also evaluated. It is observed that restricting the UAM cruise altitudes to 990
feet above Mean Sea Level (MSL) or below reduced the chance of triggering an RA to under
five percent throughout the day, even in the presence of maximum altitude error of 30 feet.
I. Introduction
NASA, in collaboration with government and industry partners, is developing concepts for Urban Air Mobility
(UAM) vehicles and technologies to support UAM vehicle operations across a network of takeoff and landing areas
(TOLAs) in metropolitan regions. These UAM operations of the future will need FAA approval. Hence, the simplest
approach to begin operations might be to start with already-existing approved routes, especially for flying into major
airports. Can UAM vehicles fly these routes with minimal impact on present-day commercial air traffic (hereafter
referred to as conventional traffic)?
This paper presents a preliminary modeling and analysis of interactions between proposed UAM operations and
conventional traffic, if UAM operations were restricted to FAA-approved helicopter routes and altitude ceilings. UAM
operations in Dallas/Fort-Worth (DFW) terminal airspace is chosen for the study. The goal of this work is to assess the
extent to which proposed initial UAM operations may trigger Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
resolution advisories (RA) aboard conventional aircraft in the DFW terminal area. A range of operational scenarios at
DFW is evaluated with combinations of UAM vehicle route, speed, altitude, and direction along the DFW “spine route.”
The analysis is done for both South flow and North flow configurations of DFW. First, results are obtained under the
assumption that UAM vehicles fly their routes precisely (i.e. no uncertainty). Then, the impact of altitude uncertainty
on these results is also evaluated.
Different route alternatives are evaluated between DFW and Frisco, Texas in this paper. DFW-Frisco operation was
selected as a test case based upon recommendations derived from traffic demand studies from potential UAM operators
in the region. The focus of research presented here is only the impact of operations for this test case on triggering TCAS
RAs on conventional aircraft. Interaction with Air Traffic Control(ATC) and other route alternatives and procedures are
not studied. Associated work by Verma et. al. [1] explored potential routes and procedures in a Human-In-The-Loop
(HITL) experiment expanding the above study region to include Dallas Lovefield (DAL) and Addison (ADS) airspace
and Dallas downtown.
The rest of this paper is divided into five sections. Section II, Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS),
provides a description of TCAS and how its logic is used in this study. Section III, DFW Airport Terminal Area
Traffic, describes DFW runways and operational configurations. Section IV, Study Approach, provides a breakdown of
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modeling assumptions, UAM operational route scenarios, selection of study days and description of simulation set up.
Section V, Results, first summarizes the results of the geometric analysis of the routes, followed by their verification
using simulations without trajectory uncertainties. It also presents the results with altitude uncertainty. Section VI,
Conclusions, discusses the overall findings and recommendations for future studies.
II. Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
In conventional operations, TCAS is the last layer to prevent mid-air collisions between aircraft other than the pilot.
The design of the TCAS logic is a trade-off between providing necessary safe separation between aircraft and preventing
unnecessary advisories. Unnecessary advisories reduce trust in the system and may increase crew and controller
workload to unacceptable levels. The system monitors the amount of horizontal and vertical separation and uses the
rates of change in horizontal and vertical separation to predict the closest point of approach between the ownship and
surrounding aircraft. A Traffic Advisory (TA) or a Resolution Advisory (RA) is issued based on thresholds for estimated
time for an intruder aircraft to enter a protected volume of airspace around a TCAS equipped aircraft (τmod) and time to
co-altitude (τvert) [2]. The boundary of the protected volume is defined by a slant range distance called DMOD.
During a TA, on a conventional aircraft, TCAS displays the intruder aircraft and notifies the pilot about a potential
conflict through visual and audio alerts. The pilot is expected to respond to a TA by (1) establishing visual contact with
the intruder and other aircraft in the vicinity and (2) maintaining current assigned clearance. During an RA, TCAS
issues maneuvers to the pilot to increase or maintain current vertical separation. The pilot is expected to immediately
respond to the indicated maneuvers unless doing so would unduly jeopardize the safe operation of the flight. When both
aircraft are equipped with TCAS II, aircraft coordinate their RA’s through Mode S datalink to ensure that complementary
RAs are selected. Due to the assumption that TCAS II is available only on conventional aircraft, RA coordination
functionality will not be discussed in this work.
Table 1 TCAS II Version 7.1 Sensitivity Levels and Thresholds for Resolution Advisories [2]
Ownship
Altitude SL Tau(sec) DMOD(nmi) ZTHR(ft)
(ft)
<1000 (AGL) 2 N/A N/A N/A
1000-2350 (AGL) 3 15 0.20 600
2350-5000 4 20 0.35 600
5000-10000 5 25 0.55 600
10000-20000 6 30 0.80 600
20000-42000 7 35 1.10 700
>42000 7 35 1.10 800
To balance the tradeoff between necessary protection and unnecessary advisories, TCAS uses an altitude-based
Sensitivity Level (SL), which controls the tau (time) thresholds for TA and RA issuance, and therefore the dimensions
of the protected airspace around each TCAS-equipped aircraft (Table 1). DMOD and ZTHR are the slant range and
vertical separation threshold of the protected airspace as per the TCAS II manual [2]. The higher the SL, the larger the
amount of protected airspace and the longer the alerting thresholds. While an aircraft is in close proximity to ground,
the SL of TCAS alert and avoidance parameters depends on the altitude of the ownship aircraft above ground level
(AGL). TCAS does not provide RAs below 1000ft AGL (SL=2). Between 1000-2350 ft AGL (SL=3), TCAS issues
RAs, if both τmod and τvert are less than 15 seconds threshold, or τmod is less than 15 seconds and current altitude
separation is less than 600 feet (vertical separation threshold).
III. DFW Airport Terminal Area Traffic
The study described in this paper uses nominal operation assumptions and procedures for DFW airport as described
in this section.
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Fig. 1 DFW Runway Map
A. DFW Runways
The DFW airport has seven physical runways shown in figure 1. These runways are operated in the South-flow
and North-flow configurations. The runways in South-flow configuration are designated as, 13L, 13R, 17L, 17C, 17R,
18L and 18R. The runways in the North-flow configuration are designated as, 31L, 31R, 35L, 35C, 35R, 36L and 36R.
These designations indicate the runway heading with respect to north. The two inner runways 18L/36R and 17R/35L are
primarily used for departures. Runways 18R/36L and 17C/35C are primarily used for arrivals [3]. Adjacent primary
departure and arrival runways are about 0.2 miles (1200 ft) apart. In North flow operations, runway 35R is used for
arrivals as the amount of traffic increases but it is less desirable being shorter and far from terminals and its use requires
aircraft to cross runways. As a rule of thumb, easterly arrivals use runway 17C/35C and westerly arrivals use runway
18R/36L. Considering the geometry of the runways, arrival and departure procedures at DFW and the expected nominal
trajectories of UAM vehicles along helicopter routes (see figure 2), interactions between commercial aircraft and UAM
are most likely to happen between aircraft arriving/departing on runways (18R,17C)/(18L,17R) in South flow and
arriving/departing from runways (36L,35C)/(36R/35L) in North Flow.
B. Departures
Ninety five percent of all departures from DFW are jets using RNAV routes [4]. Departures typically are provided
temporary level-off altitudes of 10,000ft, if their track crosses under arriving aircraft. After crossing they are cleared to
climb to their cruise altitude. The average duration of a 10,000 ft level off is about 1.7 minutes, traveling a distance of
9.4 nmi based on an assumed airspeed of 331 knots [4].
C. Arrivals
The arrivals use Runways 13R, 18R, 17C and 17L in South flow and 31R, 35C, 35R, and 36L in North flow
configurations. All approaches follow a 3 degree glide slope procedure [5]. Hence, aircraft arriving with a stable
approach are below 1000 ft AGL, 3.16 nm before the touchdown zone.
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IV. Study Approach
In this study, two routes for UAM flights operating between the city of Frisco, Texas and DFW airport were analyzed.
Frisco was selected based on recommendations derived from traffic studies by potential UAM operators in the region.
UAM-conventional aircraft interactions were evaluated from a TCAS perspective. UAM-UAM interactions were not
studied as they are out of scope for this work.
A. Assumptions and Test Cases
The following assumptions were made:
– All UAM vehicles in the simulation were modeled as the same aircraft type.
– All UAM fly along published helicopter routes.
– UAM trajectories are completely deterministic in the simulation for the first set of results and identification of
sensitive areas.
– Only altitude uncertainty is considered for the second set of results for the identified sensitive areas.
– The altitude errors are assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and varying standard deviations.
– Conventional aircraft are modeled with TCAS II version 7.1.
– UAM vehicles are not modeled with the above TCAS system but do provide the state information required by the
TCAS system on board the conventional aircraft.
– Conventional aircraft adhere to published area navigation (RNAV) routes.
Same aircraft type assumption has low impact on the relevance of this study, as we only need a representative performance
model. In future, a wider range of vehicles could be summoned based on trip length and traffic demand. However,
manufacturing and maintenance costs alone will likely push towards a preferred UAM vehicle. Existing helicopter
routes are a useful starting point as they are already designed for vehicles that operate at low altitudes with Vertical
Take-Off and Landing (VTOL) capability. Eventually, other routes and procedures can be explored (for example see [1]).
Since vertical separation was identified as a major factor that could potentially trigger RAs, from the first set of results,
altitude uncertainty was a good first candidate to study.
Four UAM operational route scenarios were evaluated:
1) Frisco, Texas to DFW entering DFW from the North (Figure 2, Scenario 1);
2) DFW to Frisco exiting DFW towards the South (Figure 2, Scenario 2);
3) DFW to Frisco exiting DFW towards the North (Figure 2, Scenario 3); and
4) Frisco to DFW entering DFW from the South (Figure 2, Scenario 4).
Each of these scenarios was studied for every DFW runway operation condition listed below for a total of 16
simulation test cases (4 UAM operation scenarios X 4 runway operation conditions). Conventional traffic data for each
runway operation condition was derived from the dates mentioned in parenthesis.
– Nominal Day in South Flow (June 03, 2017).
– Nominal Day in North Flow (November 11, 2017).
– Off-Nominal Day in South Flow (July 20, 2017).
– Off-Nominal Day in North Flow (August 7, 2017).
Nominal days were characterized by moderate meteorological (temperature between 85oF - 95oF and low
precipitation) and traffic flow conditions. The off-nominal days had maximum temperatures close to 100oF , clear skies,
and minimal weather impacted operations, allowing for the highest traffic flow with least impact on airport operations.
On these days, owing to higher temperatures, conventional aircraft may not have been able to climb as quickly as they
could on nominal days, which was expected to cause closer encounters and potentially more TCAS RAs. Furthermore,
August 7 had the highest conventional traffic in North Flow configuration for the entire year and therefore was also used
for the altitude uncertainty study.
These test cases together account for different routes, flow directions of UAM traffic between Frisco and DFW
and flow variations of conventional traffic. Additionally, in the vicinity of the airport, all UAM flying into DFW were
modeled to cruise at 1000 ft MSL, and all UAM flying out were modeled to cruise at 900 ft MSL. This separates UAM
vehicles flying into DFW by 100 ft from UAM vehicles flying out. The cruise airspeed of all UAM vehicles was modeled
at 130 knots. Although it is important to assess whether this UAM-UAM vertical separation is sufficient, it is beyond
the scope of this study. However, it ensures that UAM vehicles taking off and flying against arriving conventional traffic,
are at a higher vertical separation, compared to UAM vehicles flying in the same direction.
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Fig. 2 Flight routes between Frisco, Texas and DFW airports overlaid on FAA Sectional Charts [6]
(Clockwise from top left: Scenario 1, Scenario 2, Scenario 4 and Scenario 3)
B. Simulation Platform and Software Components
Study simulations used the SaaControl fast-time simulation software developed by NASA as a testing tool for
modeling Detect-And-Avoid (DAA) capability of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS-NAS project [7]). Conflict
avoidance algorithms (TCAS as one), surveillance and atmospheric models, and pilot response models have been
integrated into its core module. SaaControl is capable of running faster-than-real-time NAS-wide simulations. In this
study, it detects potential conflicts from raw input traffic data: flight plans for UAM and track data files for conventional
aircraft. For the TCAS logic, FAA-supplied TCAS II version 7.1 software was used with a software wrapper developed
by NASA, to integrate it into NASA simulation platforms. The wrapper packages TCAS II into a JAVA library callable
by clients. It takes aircraft states from a client, calls TCAS II, and returns TCAS responses to the client.
C. Analysis Approach
The analysis was accomplished in three stages. First, TCAS sensitivity level in the simulator was higher than a
real system. The value of sensitivity parameter DMOD was 0.66 nm as per UAS in NAS project [7], which would be
highly conservative for the near surface operations in this study. τmod measures the time it takes two aircraft to come
closer than DMOD distance. Second, scenarios that produce RAs from above were filtered using geometric aircraft
configuration data from the simulator, with the thresholds for a SL 3 TCAS operation, even below 1000 ft AGL (which
would technically be SL 2 – No RAs). Third, the correct TCAS SL was used, based on actual AGL altitude of both
aircraft consistent with what would be used by a real TCAS II system on a conventional aircraft. If there are no RAs in a
higher analysis stage, there can’t be any in the next stage. The first two stages are useful for identifying the sensitive
areas in the system. However, the results presented in the next section are based on the third and least conservative stage,
which is how TCAS would behave in a real scenario.
As an example, a sample encounter scenario is shown in figure 3 with the associated encounter parameters. Recall
that if τmod is less than the threshold and either τvert is less than the threshold or the current vertical separation is less
than the threshold, then a TCAS RA is issued. TCAS τmod(Sim) is evaluated using a DMOD of 0.66 nm as used in
UAS-NAS project [7]; in this example, that results in a value of 1 sec, which is below all τmod thresholds. From the
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Fig. 3 A Sample Scenario (CPA is Closest Point of Approach)
first stage of analysis, the simulation will flag an RA because both τmod and τvert are less than the threshold of 15 sec.
TCAS τmod(SL) is derived based on SL-specific DMOD. For SL 3, DMOD is 0.2 nm. At the second stage of analysis,
an RA is also issued because both times are below the threshold of 15 sec (SL 3). However, since DMOD is smaller, the
projected time for slant range to go below it is greater. Finally, in a real scenario, since the commercial aircraft is below
1000 ft AGL, no RA shall be issued. Results derived following this analysis are presented in the next section.
V. Results
Outside the DFW surface-to-2500 MSL class B airspace, under the assumption that conventional aircraft adhere to
published RNAV routes, they are far above the 1000-ft MSL ceiling/cruise altitude of the UAM aircraft and therefore
well separated (> 1000 ft) in altitude. Hence, the analysis here is focused only on the interactions near DFW. The region
of interest along with the sensitive areas is shown in figure 4. The thick blue lines indicate the vertical planes between
which the arriving conventional traffic is below 1000 ft AGL. They are 3.16 nm from the touchdown zone of their
respective runways. This distance was computed from the 3-degree approach glide slope described in section III.C. All
analysis for deterministic UAM trajectories is primarily geometric and hence applies to both nominal and off-nominal
days. However, those days were simulated as a secondary confirmation to ensure that no corner cases were neglected.
The elevation of DFW airport is 607 ft MSL. TCAS will not issue RAs when the conventional aircraft is below
1607 ft MSL (i.e. <1000 ft MSL). It will operate at SL=3 for conventional aircraft between 1607-2957 ft MSL. The
UAM vehicles simulated in this study are below 1607 ft MSL during their entire trajectory portion under consideration,
i.e. in the vicinity of DFW. Thus, in principle, RAs can technically be issued only at SL=3 in the worst case. If the
conventional aircraft is above 2957 MSL (SL=4), a TCAS RA will not be triggered with a UAM. In order for the
conventional aircraft at 2957 MSL to become co-altitude with the UAM vehicle at 1607 MSL within the τvert threshold
of 20 seconds, the conventional aircraft would have to descend faster than 4000 ft/min. This is much higher than a
typical descent rate of 800 ft/min that such an aircraft would use on a 3-degree final approach glide slope. Even before
the aircraft has intercepted the final glide slope, it would descend at a much lower final descent rate [9]. Therefore, the
modeling assumptions for this study prevent the time and altitude separation thresholds from ever being violated, if the
conventional aircraft is above 2957 MSL near DFW.
A. Departures Analysis
Departing conventional aircraft primarily use runways 18L and 17R in South Flow (35L and 36R in North Flow)
(Figure 1) and are above 1000 ft AGL 20 secs after departure, based on a climb rate of roughly 50 ft/sec [4]. Since the
departure runways have a minimum separation of 0.44 nm from the UAM flight paths in their take-off zones, departing
conventional aircraft are well separated horizontally from the UAM aircraft. After take-off, the conventional aircraft
climb at rates between 2000-3000 ft/min, much faster than the 500 ft/min ascent/descent rate assumed for UAM flights.
They are above the incoming UAM flight altitudes in less than 10 sec. Hence, they are always diverging and well
separated by 1000ft AGL, the altitude where the TCAS system would start producing any RAs. Therefore, under the
assumptions in this study, departing conventional aircraft will not produce RAs, even with UAM trajectory uncertainties.
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Fig. 4 Region of Interest [8]. UAM flight routes in green (North approach/departure – fluorescent green,
South approach/departure – dark green), conventional aircraft paths in orange and red and the sensitive areas
for analysis, North (figure 5) and South (figure 8) of UAM DFW vertiport, marked with purple boxes. Between
the North and South blue lines, conventional aircraft are below 1000 ft AGL.
B. Arrivals Analysis
Results in this section were determined assuming no UAM trajectory uncertainties. In every case where τmod was
violated and either the vertical separation threshold or τvert was violated, the conventional aircraft was always below
1000 ft AGL, where TCAS RAs are inhibted. Therefore, under the assumptions of this study, arriving conventional
aircraft will also not produce any RAs, if the UAM trajectories are deterministic.
North of DFW (figure 5), UAM flights departing against the direction of arriving conventional traffic are separated
horizontally by a minimum of 0.44 nm (0.64 nm from the outer runway - 0.2 nm separation between the adjacent parallel
runways) and primarily follow parallel trajectories. For interaction scenarios south of the blue line, the aircraft are
therefore well separated horizontally. Furthermore, conventional aircraft are below 1000 ft AGL with TCAS operating
at SL 2 as described at the start of this section. Hence, they issue no RAs. North of the blue line in the same figure, the
conventional aircraft are above 1000 ft AGL and have TCAS operating at SL 3. Even where τmod goes below thresholds
(e.g. where the UAM turns right and flies below conventional aircraft arrival path), the vertical separation is greater
than 600 ft and the time to co-altitude is greater than the SL 3 threshold of 15 seconds to trigger any RAs.
Such a sample encounter where τmod goes below thresholds is shown in figure 6. The evolution of vertical separation
(solid blue line) is plotted on the left axis. At SL 3, the vertical separation threshold, ZTHR is 600 ft (dashed blue line).
τmod (solid red line) and τvert (dashed red line) are plotted on the right axis. The SL 3 time thresholds are violated
below Tau = 15 sec, i.e. when τmod and τvert are between the dotted red lines. When τmod is between 0 and 15 sec,
neither the vertical separation threshold nor the τvert threshold is violated. Hence, this encounter will not trigger an RA.
Figure 7 illustrates this is true even at a high descent rate. Assume that the conventional aircraft is at AGL altitude
AC in feet (>1000 ft) and the UAM is cruising in level flight at AGL altitude AU in feet. Any aircraft above 1000 ft,
under normal operation, should not descend at a rate (ft/min) greater than its AGL altitude, i.e. maximum descent rate
or maximum vertical closure rate, VZC = AC in ft/min. Hence time to co-altitude, τvert = separation/(closure rate per
min/60) = separation/(closure rate in sec) = ((AC - AU )/AC )*60 = (1 - AU /AC )*60 seconds. For maximum AU = 400
ft and minimum AC > 1000 ft, minimum τvert > 36 sec. Hence time to co-altitude is always greater than 36 seconds,
which is more than double the time threshold for SL 3. The vertical separation threshold of 600 ft is also not violated
because AC - AU > 600 ft.
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Fig. 5 Sensitive Area North of DFW. UAM flight route in green, conventional aircraft landing and take-off
paths in orange and dark red. Bright red arrows denote horizontal separations. South of blue line,
conventional aircraft are below 1000 ft AGL.
Fig. 6 A sample encounter North of DFW (north of blue line in figure 4). Note: Actual onboard TCAS II RA
logic will ignore diverging aircraft, hence τmod and τvert will only be computed when they are non-negative.
South of DFW (figure 8), the UAM flight route intersects with conventional aircraft runway approaches after the
conventional aircraft is already below 1000 ft AGL (north of blue line) with TCAS operating at SL 2. Hence, no RAs
will be issued. South of blue line (region not shown in figure 8), the conventional aircraft are separated by at least 0.5
nautical miles horizontally and more than 600 ft vertically. Following the same explanation as the SL 3 situation north
of DFW (see figure 7), the vertical violation criteria is never satisfied. Hence, no RAs are issued.
These results cover all combinations of UAM vehicle routes, altitudes and directions studied. They also account for
variations in UAM vehicle cruise speeds. When conventional aircraft are below 1000 ft AGL, there will be no RAs
irrespective of the closure rates (slant and vertical). When they are above 1000 ft AGL, the lack of RAs is due to vertical
closure rates and adequate vertical separation. The entire analysis is therefore agnostic to UAM cruise speeds.
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Fig. 7 Worst case scenario, when conventional aircraft is above 1000 ft AGL
Fig. 8 Sensitive Area South of DFW. UAM flight route in green, conventional aircraft landing and take-off
paths in orange and dark red. Bright red arrows denote horizontal separations. North of blue line,
conventional aircraft are below 1000 ft AGL.
C. Altitude Uncertainty Analysis
Although τvert was never violated when the conventional aircraft were above 1000 ft AGL, it is noteworthy that
the vertical separation threshold (600 ft) was very close to violation at the intersection of the UAM route and the
conventional aircraft arrival path south of DFW, when the UAM vehicles fly into DFW (at 1000 ft MSL). A sample
encounter from this sensitive area is shown in figure 9. Although there is a time when τmod is less than 15 sec and the
vertical separation is less than 600 feet, the conventional aircraft is already below 1000 ft AGL at that time. Hence,
TCAS will ignore the UAM vehicle and not trigger an RA. However, if the UAM vehicle had a vertical position error
of even 10 ft, it would have triggered an RA in this scenario. Hence, the natural next step is to explore the impact of
trajectory uncertainties.
In this paper, only altitude uncertainty was explored. Vertical GPS errors with available technologies today are less
than 10 m (≈30 ft) even in the worst case. This was simulated by introducing errors in the altitude of UAM vehicles.
The errors were assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and standard deviation (StD) varying from 5 ft to
30 ft. The maximum error allowed was thrice of the chosen StD. Hence, even though the maximum errors in reality
shouldn’t exceed 30 ft, errors were simulated up to 90 ft.
It is noteworthy that UAM vehicles departing DFW were modeled to cruise at 900 ft MSL (293 ft AGL) and hence,
even with a maximum error of 90ft, they wouldn’t trigger RAs at the sensitive area identified above. Hence, analysis
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Fig. 9 A sample encounter South of DFW (north of blue line in figure 4). Note: Actual onboard TCAS II RA
logic will ignore diverging aircraft, hence τmod and τvert will only be computed when they are non-negative.
was only done for Scenario 4, where UAM vehicles fly from Frisco to DFW and enter DFW from the South, passing
below the conventional aircraft arrival paths at 1000 ft MSL (393 ft AGL). Furthermore, encounters were simulated
with the conventional aircraft track data for August 7, 2017. That day had the highest North Flow traffic of the year and
hence, maximum potential encounters.
Figure 11 top row shows the probability of triggering an RA for a UAM vehicle departing Frisco at the times
shown on the horizontal axis, as the altitude error StD varies from 5 ft to 30 ft. The probability variation followed the
conventional traffic demand change through the day. During lean times (before 9a and after 7:30p), even a 30 ft error
StD did not produce more than forty percent risk of triggering an RA. During the peak conventional traffic rush between
Fig. 10 Risk of triggering RAs on a typical day of operation - Noon-3p
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9a and 7:30p, it is observed that even a 5-ft error StD produced over twenty percent risk of triggering RAs at certain
times. This risk increased to over forty percent, when the error StD was increased to 10 ft or more. A potential solution
to this problem could be that the UAM fly into DFW at a slightly lower altitude below the arrival paths. To justify
this recommendation, the above analysis was repeated by lowering the UAM vehicle mean altitude by 5 ft and 10 ft,
respectively. It was observed that, in general, lowering the mean altitude by twice the allowable error StD substantially
reduced the risk of triggering RAs. As an example, in figure 11, third row, lowering the UAM vehicle mean altitude
by 10 ft, reduced the chance of triggering an RA to under ten percent throughout the day, even with a 10-ft error StD
(maximum error 30 ft). For clarity, figure 10 shows a zoomed version of the variation from noon to 3p.
VI. Conclusions
The study found that using a basic model of UAM performance, UAM vehicles simulated to operate from Frisco to
DFW utilizing existing helicopter routes as shown in figure 2, triggered no RAs on conventional aircraft. These results
were obtained under the assumption of deterministic UAM vehicle trajectories, i.e. zero error in observed and true
position of the UAM vehicles. Meteorological conditions, such as wind, which could affect this accuracy, were ignored.
These results suggest a very high navigational performance requirement on UAM, if operations were to be enabled with
high UAM trajectory determinism.
From the altitude uncertainty study, it was also observed that the above performance requirements could be slightly
relaxed by operating the UAM vehicles at or below 990 ft MSL (383 ft AGL), if they can adhere to a maximum altitude
error of 15 ft from their trajectory. Furthermore, the primary reason for the lack of RAs is that conventional aircraft are
either already, by procedure, well separated horizontally and vertically; or are below 1000 ft AGL otherwise (which
suppresses RAs). Even though this is true for DFW based on its particular runway configuration, a similar analysis can
be performed at any other airport to determine the sensitive regions for TCAS RA alerts.
It should be noted that TCAS II ignores intruders below 360 ft AGL. This means any UAM flights below 967 ft
MSL (around DFW) are automatically ignored by current TCAS operation criteria. This can be interpreted in two
ways. In the short term, UAM flights around any airport in the country can be kept below 360 ft AGL to enable early
operations, if necessary, without triggering RAs. In the long term, this could create potential issues with high density of
near-ground traffic and therefore, might necessitate an update to the TCAS logic to account for the same. Therefore, this
is also an important area for further investigation.
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